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Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - Wirtschaftswissen­schaftliche Fakultät

Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz

Spandauerstraße 1
10178 Berlin
Phone: +49.30.2093.5676
e-mail: strauszr[at]wiwi.hu-berlin.de



Downloadable CV (February 2015)


Prof. Dr. Roland Strausz joined the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin as Heisenberg-Professor in June 2007 and now chairs the Institute of Economic Theory 1. He received his doctorate at the Free University of Berlin in 1998, where he finished his habilitation in 2005. He is director of the RTG1659 "Interdependencies in the regulation of markets" and a principal investigator in the SFB TR15 "Governance and the efficiency of economic systems" and SFB649 "Economic Risk". Prof. Strausz is member of the council "Economic Theory" and "Industrial economics" of the Verein für Socialpolitik and a research Fellow in the CESIfo Network and CEPR. He is further a founding member of the Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science (BDPEMS). His research interests are contract theory, mechanism design, and industrial organization. His work has been published in Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, and other international journals.


Main Refereed Publications:

  1. Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights (with Daniel Krähmer) Review of Economic Studies, (doi: 10.1093/restud/rdv003).
  2. On the Timing of Climate Agreements (with Robert Schmidt) Environmental and Resource Economics (doi: 10.1007/s10640-014-9828-2).
  3. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives" (with D. Shin) RAND Journal of Economics 45 495-520, 2014 (doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12059).
  4. "Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation" (with R. Fiocco), Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
    accepted for publication 2013.
  5. "Migration of the Talented: Can Europe catch up with the U.S.?" (with L. Mechtenberg) Journal of Public Economic Theory 14, 945–969, 2012. (doi: 10.1111/jpet.12005)
  6. "Mediated Contracts and Mechanism Design", Journal of Economic Theory 147 (3), 1280-1290, 2012. (doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.005)
  7. Comments to “Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents” [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217] (with D. Krähmer) Journal of Economic Theory 146, 2159-2164, 2011. (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.005)
  8. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning", (with D. Krähmer), Review of Economic Studies 78, 1015-1041, 2011. (doi: 10.1093/restud/rdq033).
  9. "Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation", Economic Journal 121, 740–762, 2011. (10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02441.x)
  10. "Monopoly Distortions in Durability and Multi-Dimensional Quality" Economics Letters 105, 333-335, 2009. (doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.009)
  11. "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs" Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 18, 845–870, 2009. (doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00231.x)
  12. "Accounting Transparency and the Asset Substitution Problem" (with K. Burkhardt) The Accounting Review 84 (3), 689-713, 2009. (doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.3.689)
  13. "Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable QualityEconomic Journal 119, 1405-1421, 2009. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02290.x) 
  14. "Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening", (with D. Krähmer), B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 8:1 (Topics), Article 25, 2008. (doi:10.2202/1935-1704.1458)
  15. "The Bologna Process: How student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality" (with L Mechtenberg) International Tax and Public Finance 15, 109-130, 2008. (doi:10.1007/s10797-007-9040-1)
  16. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication" (with H. Bester), Journal of Economic Theory 136, 236-259, 2007. (doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.009)
  17. "VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities", (with D. Krähmer) Economics Letters 94, 192-196, 2007. (doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.028)
  18. "Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty" German Economic Review 8, 107-121, 2007. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0475.2007.00136.x)
  19. "Interim Information in Long Term Contracts",  Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 15, 1041-1067, 2006. (doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00127.x)
  20. "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.60, 460-470, 2006. (doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.10.004)
  21. "Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms Principal-Agent Models", Journal of Economic Theory 128, 306-314, 2006. (doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.008)
  22. "Ordinary Shares and Managers", Journal of Economics 87, 1-14, 2006. (doi:10.1007/s00712-005-0170-6)
  23. "Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 59, 89-107, 2006. (doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.03.013)
  24. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment", (with K.Mitusch) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21,  467-500, 2005. (doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewi018)
  25. "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture",  International Journal of Industrial Organization 23, 45-62, 2005. (doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.09.002)
  26. "Comment on Internalization of Knowledge Spillovers in R&D Joint Ventures", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160, 75-78, 2004. (doi:10.1628/093245604773861113)
  27. "Deterministic Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle", Economics Letters 79, 333-37, 2003. (doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00037-5)
  28. "Mitigating Non-Contractibility with Interim Randomization" Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 157, 231-245, 2001. Abstract  (doi: 10.1628/0932456013623132)
  29. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case" (with H. Bester) Econometrica 69, 1077-1098, 2001. Abstract  (doi: 10.1111/1468-0262.00231)
  30. "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Multi-Agent Case" (with H. Bester) Economics Letters 69, 165-171, 2000. (doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00301-3)
  31. " Regulation in a Political Economy: An explanation of limited commitment of governments in the context of the ratchet effect", Economics of Governance 1, 181-197, 2000. Abstract. (doi:10.1007/PL00011013)
  32. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships", Journal of Economic Theory 85, 140-156, 1999. Abstract  (doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2496)
  33. "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship", The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 99, 497-518, 1997. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9442.00078)
  34. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal Agent Relationship", Review of Economic Studies 64, 337-357, 1997. Abstract (doi: 10.2307/2971717)


Other publications:

  • "Book Review  “Bolton, P., and Dewatripont, M.: Contract Theory”, Journal of Economics, 2006.
  • Comment on “Internalization of Knowledge Spillovers in R&D Joint Ventures”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160, 75-78, 2004.
  • "Mediation in innerbetrieblichen Konfliktsituationen" (with K. Mitusch), Entlohnung, Arbeitsorganisation und personalpolitische Regulierung: Beiträge zum 4. Köln-Bonner Kolloquium zur Personalökonomie, U. Backes-Gellner (Hg.), München 2001.
  • "Politieke machtsverhoudingen", (with Eric van Damme, Vincent Feltkamp, Sjaak Hurkens), Economische Statistische Berichten 79, 482-486, 1994.


Current Working Papers:


Referee for:
American Economic Review, Economic Journal, Econometrica, Economica, Economics of Governance, European Economic Review, European Journal of Political Economy, Games and Economic Behavior, German Economic Review, International Economic Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, Journal of Public Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften (ZWS)


"On Incentives and Asymmetric Information in Organizations", Shaker Verlag, 1998