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Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - International Office

Bachelor Courses in English Summer Term 2018

This page is just an unofficial excerpt from the course list for summer term 2018. It was changed last on Nov 30th, 2017 and does not claim correctness or completeness. Please always check the current course lists for updates.

This page is just an unofficial excerpt from the course list for summer term 2018. It was changed last on Nov 30th, 2017 and does not claim correctness or completeness. Please always check the current course lists for updates.

You can find detailed information and the schedule in the course list:

www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/studium/sb/lehrangebot

 

Overview:

  1. Business Administration: Lecutres
  2. Business Administration: Seminars
  3. Economics: Lecutres
  4. Economics: Seminars
  5. Quantitaitve Methods: Seminars

 

Business Administration: Lecutres (no registration required)

 

1) Valuation (708009)
  • Lecture+Tutorial (4 hours/week)
  • Prof. Brüggemann

The goal of the course is to present students the basic tools to value firms and other assets. The course comprises three main parts. The first part presents the mechanics of relative and intrinsic valuation. The second part focuses on how to estimate the inputs for these valuation methods (e.g., forecasting cash flows or earnings, estimating the cost of capital). The third part deals with special valuation cases (e.g., valuing start-ups or private firms).

Examination: Written exam (90 min)

 

2) Financial Economics for Citizens (701139)
  • Lecture+Tutorial (4 hours/week)
  • Prof. XXX

This course is based on a series of lectures regarding the functions of financial markets in society. We will start with some lectures regarding the history of financial markets. Then, we will turn to a non-technical introduction to modern finance theory. Based on a solid understanding of the theory, students will be able to interpret information revealed by financial markets and to recognize common abuses of such information in policy-making. The last part of the course concerns the interaction between finance and politics, i.e. how legislation and regulation directly influence the structure of financial markets and how players in these markets intervene in the political process to create or modify legislative and regulatory outcomes.

Students will participate in economic experiments that are supposed to illustrate the fragility of financial markets. Besides participating in the experiments, students will also learn to prepare experiments, to guide participants who are not economists, and to lead discussions regarding financial markets.

A component of the exercise is an ungraded presentation (20 min) and discussion.

Literature:

  • Bernstein, P., 1992, Capital Ideas: The Remarkable Origins of Modern Wall Street, Free Press. Bernstein, P., 2007, Capital Ideas Evolving, John Wiley & Sons.
  • Fourcade, M., 2009, Economists and Societies, Princeton University Press.
  • MacKenzie, D., 2006, An Engine, not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets, MIT Press. McCarty, N., K. T. Poole, and H. Rosenthal, 2013, Political Bubbles, Princeton University Press.
  • Mian, A., and A. Sufi, 2014, House of Debt, University of Chicago Press.

Examination: Written exam (60 min)

 

3) Behavioral Finance and Asset Pricing (701138)
  • Lecture+Tutorial (4 hours/week)
  • PD Kasch

This course introduces the students to the behavioral finance view on asset pricing. The course starts with a discussion of the foundations of the efficient markets hypothesis and then focuses on theoretical and empirical challenges faced by this hypothesis. The topics covered in the course include noise trading, investor sentiment, limits to arbitrage, overreaction and underreaction to news, excess volatility, return predictability, market booms and busts, historical/institutional trends in market development. A component of the course is an ungraded 15-20 minutes presentation by the students.

Prerequisite: Grundlagen der Finanzwirtschaft I & II (Investition und Finanzierung + Investmentanalyse und Portfoliomanagement)

Literature: Andrei Shleifer, 2000, Inefficient Markets. An Introduction to Behavioral Finance, Oxford University Press. Robert Shiller, 2015, Irrational Exuberance, Princeton University Press, Third Edition.

Examination: Written exam (60 min)

 

Business Administration: Seminars (registration required!)

 

1) Seminar Innovative Entrepreneurship (70638)
  • Seminar (2 hours/week)
  • Prof. Schade
  • Registration: Please register via the registration form on the website of the Chair of Entrepreneurial and Behavioral Decision Making by 28 February 2017.

This course equips students with a deeper knowledge of selected aspects of the field of economics of entrepreneurship (i.e. this might cover the personality of the entrepreneur, gender aspects of entrepreneurship, macro- or microeconomic aspects of entrepreneurship). Students understand the fundamental requirements of working scientifically. Thereby, they have acquired the following basic skills: to conduct a scientific Literaturee search, to write a scientific seminar paper, to critically evaluate and discuss their research with the audience. A component of the seminar is an ungraded presentation and discussion.

Max. number of participants: 20

Examination: Term paper

 

2) Market Microstructure I, II (70655)
  • Seminar (4 hours/week)
  • Prof. Müller
  • Registration till April 19, 2017

Further information about the course and registration: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/finanz

Identical content in alternative I and alternative II. Number of participants: max. 20 per course. Registration till April 19, 2017

Literature: siehe Homepage des Institutes

Examination: Written exam (60 min), a component of the seminar is an ungraded term paper.

 
2) Issues in Finance (70670)
  • Seminar (2 hours/week)
  • Prof. Müller
  • Registration necessary

Further information about the course and registration: https://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/de/professuren/bwl/finanz/lehre/seminaranmeldung

Number of participants: max. 24 per course.

Check https://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/de/professuren/bwl/finanz/lehre for more information regarding Exam and Literature.

 

Economics: Lectures (no registration required)

 

1) Labour Economics (70829)
  • Lecture+Tutorial (4 hours/week)
  • Prof. Spitz-Oener

The actors in the labor market: workers, firms, government; labor supply and labor demand; labor market equilibrium; compensating wage differentials; human capital; the wage structure; labor mobility; labor market discrimination; unemployment; labor market policy.

Literature: Borjas, G.: Labor Economics, 6th edition (McGraw-Hill)

Examination: Written exam (90 min)

 

2) Monetary Economics (70881)
  • Lecture+Tutorial (4 hours/week)
  • Prof. Weinke

Micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium models have become the standard tool for macroeconomic analysis. This course will provide an introduction into these models and how to work with them. Our baseline New Keynesian model features sticky prices combined with monopolistic competition. That framework has emerged as a powerful tool for monetary policy analysis. Its adoption as the backbone of medium-scale models currently developed by central banks and policy institutions is a clear reflection of its success. Unfortunately, this success has not (yet) inspired anybody to write a textbook which introduces that material to undergraduate students. That's a pity, but this course provides a nice opportunity to learn about the most recent developments in the field of monetary economics in a way that is appropriate for undergraduate students. Related to this, I should also mention that the references mentioned below go (slightly) beyond the level of this course.

  1. Why Are Economic Models Useful?
  2. The New Keynesian Model and its Empirical Relevance.
  3. Welfare Based Evaluation of Monetary Policy.
  4. Macroeconomic Stability and Monetary Policy.
  5. Rules vs. Discretion.
  6. Optimal Monetary Policy under Discretion.
  7. Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment.
  8. Monetary and Fiscal Policy.
  9. Financial Frictions.
  10. Wrapping It Up.

Literature:

  • Clarida, Richard, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler (1999): "The Science of Monetary Policy: a New Keynesian Perspective", Journal of Economic Literaturee, 37(4), 1661–1707.
  • Galí, Jordi (2008): Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle, Princeton University Press.

Examination: Written exam (90 min)

 

3) Theory of Social Choice (70899)
  • Lecture+Tutorial (4 hours/week)
  • Prof. Gaertner

The lectures start out from Kenneth Arrow's famous Impossibility Theorem, discuss possibility results under restricted domains of preferences, consider the issue of manipulability or strategy-proofness, the exercise of individual rights in the framework of collective decisions, scoring functions and related schemes, Rawlsian and utilitarian justice, various bargaining solutions and finally consider empirical studies in relation to distributive justice.

  1. Introduction and Arrow’s Impossibility Result from Different Angles: Arrow has a famous impossibility theorem which states that under certain plausible axioms there does not exist a so-called Social Welfare Function. We shall look into the details of his proof. (Arrow, K. J. 1963. Social choice and individual values. Chapter 3; Bergson, A. 1966. “A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics”, in Essays in Normative Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Sen, A. K. 1995. “Rationality and Social Choice”, American Economic Review 85:1–24.)
  2. Domain Restrictions, Qualitative and Quantitative: We shall weaken Arrow’s “unrestricted domain condition” and shall examine some conditions which restrict the domain of individual preferences. (Gaertner, Wulf. 1979. “An Analysis and Comparison of Several Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Transitivity Under the Majority Decision Rule”, in Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, J. J. Laffont (ed.) Amsterdam: North Holland; Gaertner, Wulf. 2001. Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Maskin, E. 1995. “Majority Rule, Social Welfare Functions, and Game Forms”, in Choice, Welfare and Development, K. Basu, P. K. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sen, Amartya. 1966. “A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decision”, Econometrica 34:75–79; Sen, Amartya, and P. K. Pattanaik. 1969. “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice under Majority Decision”, Journal of Economic Theory 1:178–202.)
  3. Rights and Social Choice: This lecture will deal with the exercise of individual rights within the procedure of aggregating individual preferences. Sen has an impossibility result which says that the exercise of individual rights clashes with the Pareto principle. (Gaertner, W., P. K. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura. 1992. “Individual Rights Revisited”. Economica 59:161–177; Gibbard, Allan. 1974. “A Pareto Consistent Libertarian Claim”. Journal of Economic Theory 7:388–410; Sen, Amartya. 1970. “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal”. Journal of Political Economy 78:152–157; Sen, Amartya. 1992. “Minimal Liberty”. Economica 59:139–159.)
  4. Manipulability: Gibbard and Satterthwaite came up with another impossibility result which claims that within the Arrovian context it is in general to the advantage of an individual not to state his or her true or honest preferences. (Gibbard, Allan. 1973. “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result”. Econometrica 41 (4):587–601; Kelly, S. J. 1988. Social Choice Theory. Chapters 10 & 11; Moulin, H. 1980. “On Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness”. Public Choice 35:437–455.)
  5. Social Choice Rules: This lecture discusses various scoring functions and their properties. One of the best known scoring functions is the Borda count developed by de Borda in the 18th century. (Gärdenfors, P. 1973. “Positionalist Voting Functions”. Theory and Decision 4:1–24; Kelly, S. J. 1988. Social Choice Theory. Chapters 5 & 6; Sen, Amartya. 1977. “Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination”. Econometrica 45:53–89; Young, H. P. 1974. “An Axiomatisation of Borda's Rule”. Journal of Economic Theory 9:43–52.)
  6. Rawlsian and Utilitarian Justice: We describe axiomatically and discuss both the Rawlsian maximin principle and the utilitarian rule of summation of individual utility values. Both mechanisms share some common properties but, of course, diverge on others. (Blackorby, C., D. Donaldson, and J. A. Weymark. 1984. “Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagrammatic Introduction”. International Economic Review 25:327–356; Gevers, L., and C. d'Aspremont. 1977. “Equity and informational basis of collective choice”. Review of Economic Studies 46:199–210; Hammond, P. J. 1976. “Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle”. Econometrica 44:793–804; Harsanyi, J. C. 1978. “Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics”. American Economic Review 68:223–228; Roemer, J. E. 1996. Theories of Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.)
  7. Cooperative Bargaining: We discuss two of the best known bargaining procedures which use cardinal individual utilities but do not assume the possibility of interpersonal comparability of these utility values, namely the Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai- Smorodinsky solution. (Gaertner, W. 2009. A Primer in Social Choice Theory, rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kalai, E. and
  8. Smorodinsky. 1975. “Other Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem”. Econometrica 43:513-518; Luce, R.D. and H. Raiffa. 1957. Games and Decisions. New York: John Wiley (chapter 6); Nash, J.F. 1950. “The Bargaining Problem”. Econometrica 18: 155-162. Part of the lecture are an essay (8 - 10 pages) and presentation (ungraded).

Literature:

  • General readings: Arrow, K. J. 1963. Social choice and individual values, 2nd ed. New York: John Wiley.
  • Craven, J. 1992. Social Choice: A Framework for Collective Decisions and Individual Judgements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Gaertner, Wulf. 2009. A Primer in Social Choice Theory, rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kelly, S. J. 1988. Social Choice Theory, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
  • Nurmi, H. 1999. Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them. Springer-Verlag.
  • Sen, Amartya. 1987. “Social Choice”, in The New Palgrave, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newmann (eds.) London: MacMillan. Sen, Amartya K. 1984. Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Amsterdam; New York: North-Holland.

Examination: Written exam (90 min)

 

4) International Macroeconomics (70818)
  • Lecture+Tutorial (4 hours/week)
  • Prof. Schwark

The lecture develops a theoretical framework that is useful to think about a wide variety of topics in international macroeconomics (along the lines of “International Macroeconomics” by Schmitt-Grohé, Uribe and Woodford.). The tutorial helps understand the material of the lecture in different ways. First, some additional derivations of theoretical and empirical results are provided. Second, applications of the theory are illustrated.

Examination: Written exam (90 min)

 

5) Network based energy systems (707502)
  • Lecture+Tutorial (4 hours/week)
  • Prof. Hubert

The lecture familiarizes students with the basic notions and tools of the analysis of energy markets and strategic behavior in these markets with an emphasis on electric power and gas. The lecture is accompanied by a tutorial.

Examination: Written exam (90 min)

 

5) European Integration (70896)
  • Lecture+Tutorial (4 hours/week)
  • Prof. Michael C. Burda, Ph.D.

Examination: Written exam (90 min)

 

Economics: Seminars (registration required!)

 

1) Economics and Nationalism (7010909)
  • Seminar (2 hours/week)
  • Dr Felix
  • Registration: Via E-mail to Ulas Karakoc: karakolu@hu-berlin.de before April 10, 2018

 

Today we see on the one hand rising nationalist tendencies (e.g. anti-migration protests and an upswing for right wing parties) and on the other hand a globalized capitalist economy. Therefore, we will deal with several branches of literature (e.g. economic history, economics of identity) to discuss the following two questions: How can economics theorize nationalism? What is the link between economic developments and nationalism in the past and the present?

Component of the Seminar: presentation (ungraded)

Max. number of participants: 25

Please send a mail to Felix Kersting (f.kersting@hu-berlin.de). If there are more applicants then spots, we will make a lottery in advance.

 

Literature:

Shayo, M. (2009). A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class and Redistribution. American Political Science Review 103(2), 147-174.

Özkirimli, U. (2010). Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan.

Conrad, S. (2010). Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany. Oxford University Press.

Examination: Term paper

 

 

Quantitative Methods: Seminars (registration required!)

 

1) Statistical Programming Languages (70 1016)
  • Seminar (2 hours/week)
  • N.N.

A component of the seminar is an ungraded presentation. See    http://lvb.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/Teaching_Moodle.

Examination: Term paper

 

2) Selected Topics in History of Statistics (70 1031)
  • Seminar (2 hours/week)
  • Prof. Vogt

A component of the seminar is an ungraded presentation (30 min).

Please register in the respective Moodle course, see http://lvb.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/Teaching_Moodle . No participation limit. Registration in the first meeting.

Examination: Term paper

 

Quantitative Methods: Lectures

 

1) Datenanalyse I (Data Analysis I) (701009)
  • Lecture+Tutorial (4 hours/week)
  • Prof. Klinke

The lecture covers classical statistical topics and we will work half of the time with R & RStudio in the PC-Pool. Note: The lecture will be held in german, but the course material will be in english.

Literature:

  • Barnett, V., Lewis, T. (1994) Outliers in statistical data, 3rd. Edition, Wiley, New York
  • Berry, D.A., Lindgren, B.W. (1990), Statistics: Theory and Methods, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove
  • Bortz, J. (1993), Statistik, Springer, Berlin et al.
  • Bosch, K. (1992), Statistik-Taschenbuch, Oldenbourg, München, Wien
  • Bühl, A., Zöfel, P. (1994), SPSS unter Windows Version 6, Addison-Wesley, Bonn et al.
  • Böning, H., Trenkler, G. (1978), Nichtparametrische statistische Methoden, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York
  • Böning, H. (1991), Robuste und adaptive Tests, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York
  • Hartung, J., Elpelt, B., Klösener, K.-H. (1993), Statistik, Oldenbourg Verlag, München
  • Heiler, S., Michels, P. (1994), Deskriptive und explorative Datenanalyse, Oldenbourg, München, Wien
  • Jobson, J.D. (1991), Applied Multivariate Data Analysis, Vol. I: Regression and Experimental Design, Springer, Berlin et al.
  • Köhler, W.-M. (1994), SPSS für Windows, Vieweg, Wiesbaden
  • Mann, P. S. (1992), Introductory Statistics, John Wiley, New York at al.
  • Rasmussen, S. (1992), An Introduction to Statistics with Data Analysis, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove
  • Rönz: Skript zur Vorlesung "Computergestützte Statistik I", 2001
  • Rönz, B., Strohe, H. G. (Hrsg., 1994), Lexikon Statistik, Gabler-Verlag, Wiesbaden
  • Schlittgen, R. (1990), Einführung in die Statistik, Oldenbourg, München, Wien

Examination: Written Exam (90 Min.)

 

Also interesting: Classes "Berlin Perspectives"

 

A variety of interesting classes you can also choose from:

Please check with your home university if classes can be credited at home

https://www.hu-berlin.de/en/institutions/administration/bolognalab/projekte-des-bologna.labs-en/berlin-perspectives/kursprogramm

 

See you soon!