

SWIMMING UPSTREAM: STRUGGLING FIRMS IN CORRUPT CITIES*

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Abstract

We find that a corrupt local environment amplifies the effects of financial distress. Following regional spikes in financial misconduct, credit becomes both more difficult and expensive to obtain for nearby borrowers – even those not implicated themselves. This is particularly harmful for cash-constrained firms, which cut investment more sharply and lay off more workers during industry downturns. We also find that local waves of financial misconduct are a risk factor for bankruptcy.

Keywords: financial misconduct, corporate failure, bankruptcy, loan spread, security issuance, trust

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1 Introduction

Dallas and Minneapolis are fairly comparable cities in the central United States, each with a fast growing population, vibrant business center, and reputation for cultivating business-friendly climates. Over 100 public firms currently call the Minneapolis region home, placing it 5th in ratio to population among large U.S. cities, with Dallas-Fort Worth (7th) close behind. These cities, however, tend to be very different along one very important dimension. From 1970-2010, firms in the Dallas metropolitan area were over twice as likely to be prosecuted for financial misconduct as those headquartered in and around Minneapolis (2.21% versus 0.93%), a disparity peaking in the 1998-2002 time period, during which Dallas produced more cases of financial misconduct (14) than were produced in Minneapolis (10) over the entire four decades.

In this paper, we ask whether proximity to a wave of financial misconduct – like Dallas in the late 1990s – creates a unique set of challenges for resident companies. Similar to foreign investors pulling out of countries following civil unrest or nationalization (Schneider and Frey (1985)), we hypothesize that city-level waves of financial misconduct may temporarily taint an entire region, reducing financiers’ willingness to provide capital to local firms. Among those most reliant on external finance, such frictions may influence real business decisions such as investment and employment, and in extreme cases, even survival.

That banks (and other providers of finance) would be wary of financial misconduct is not a new idea. For one, when a firm’s financial statements are not viewed as credible, it is difficult to estimate its ability to repay, or should it default, the value of its assets upon liquidation. Either will increase the cost of borrowing.¹ A second consideration is that a history of financial misconduct reflects poorly on the ‘trustworthiness’ of the firm’s executives.² A manager who does not respect explicit rules – think about misrepresenting

¹See Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004) and Hribar and Jenkins (2004) for evidence that concerns regarding earnings quality and restatements, respectively, increase the firm’s cost of capital.

²The theoretical contracting literature distinguishes between the concepts of *trust* and *reputation*; see Cabral (2012). Trust is typically invoked in moral hazard problems (involving hidden actions), whereas the concept of reputation arises in contexts involving adverse selection (involving hidden types). In a pure case

earnings or trading on inside information – is unlikely to respect implicit agreements, which often play a role in debt financing.³ At best, a lack of trust imposes additional costs (e.g., writing more complete contracts), and at worst, may prevent financing altogether.

What is new, and the subject of this paper, is whether a firm’s financial misconduct imposes negative local spillovers on *nearby* firms that are not (perhaps yet) implicated themselves. Our analysis build on our earlier work, Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman (2015), which analyzes financial misconduct data from Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin (2013), and finds that financial misconduct occurs in distinct, regionally-concentrated waves, involving firms in a wide variety of sectors. This indicates that the determinants of financial misconduct have a strong regional component. Consequently, this paper examines whether evidence of financial fraud in a region has a material effect on the credit conditions of its resident firms.

We begin our analysis by exploring the link between regional rates of financial misconduct and credit supplied. Firms headquartered in cities with recent spikes in financial misconduct borrow less frequently and/or lower amounts. Though the results differ across specifications, firms located in areas experiencing a wave of financial misconduct are about 10-15% less likely to issue significant amounts of debt (defined as greater than 5% of total assets). These reductions are not offset by additional equity issuance, implying that overall external capital flows are reduced.

Whereas this result is consistent with banks becoming more cautious about lending in geographic regions with recent financial misconduct (a supply effect), it is also possible that demand for credit is lower in these areas. Thus, we examine whether the cost of lending also varies with financial misconduct. Although the sample here is reduced – limited to firms taking out syndicated loans – we estimate a small, but statistically significant *increase* in

of the former, “trusting” the agent is equivalent to understanding her payoffs given different actions, and thereby being able to predict her actions, e.g., trigger strategies in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. When both adverse selection and moral hazard are at work, agents can choose actions to build their reputations. This paper makes no distinction between pure trust (moral hazard) games and those where trust and reputation are mixed. What matters is that there exists regional and temporal variation in their determinants, e.g., social punishment being an especially effective deterrent in some cities compared to others.

³See for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Sharpe (1990), and Bharath, Dahiya, Sanders, and Srinivasan (2011) for discussions of implicit contracts in lending relationships.

the cost of bank credit. For regions in the top decile of financial misconduct, resident firms pay, on average, about 18 basis points more in interest costs, after controlling for time effects and a variety of firm-specific controls. This result, combined with the reduction in credit supplied, suggests that financial misconduct creates an additional friction for firms raising external finance.

For some firms these frictions may have real effects, influencing either the firm's investment (Section 4.1) or employment (4.2) policies. Because cash rich firms and/or those with good prospects can self-finance, dislocations in credit markets are less likely to be a concern. On the other hand, policies of struggling firms may be significantly disrupted. Using the Kaplan-Zingales index to identify a set of firms likely to be financially constrained,⁴ we find that effects of negative industry shocks appear to be magnified for firms headquartered in corrupt cities. Specifically, we find that in response to a decline of at least 10% in industry-level investment, constrained firms headquartered in cities experiencing the top decile of financial misconduct cut investment by almost twice as much compared to constrained firms in less corrupt locations. Similar patterns are observed for employment changes during industry downturns, with reductions in head count being about 50% more severe for constrained firms in high-fraud areas.

In our final analysis (Section 5), we consider the ultimate sequelae of local waves of financial misconduct – bankruptcies in the region. A cursory look at the data indicates a strong cross-city correlation between rates of financial misconduct and rates of corporate failure, as shown in Figure 1. The vertical-axis graphs the average bankruptcy rate for firms headquartered in each of the 20 largest cities in the U.S. from 1970-2010, and the horizontal axis plots the average rates of financial misconduct for each city over the same horizon. The positive cross-city correlation (0.65) is clearly apparent, indicating that cities with high rates of financial misconduct tend to have high corporate failure rates.

Similar patterns emerge in the time-series. That is, it is not simply that cities such as

⁴See Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001).

Dallas have higher than average bankruptcy rates, but rather that firms headquartered in Dallas are particularly likely to fail following waves of financial misconduct, such as 1998-2002. Being located in the top decile of regional financial misconduct increases by about 20% (0.40 percentage points) the likelihood that a resident firm will go bankrupt the following year. Thus, these results indicate that regional information on financial misconduct provides explanatory power in failure models even after controlling for firm-specific variables typically employed in such models.

While previous research has studied the costs, both direct (e.g., SEC penalties) and indirect (e.g., increased cost of capital), of committing financial misconduct (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008)), the effect of any spillovers to nearby firms is less understood. In this respect, the most similar paper to ours is Giannetti and Wang (2014), which finds that following accounting scandals, local investors – such as those in Houston after the Enron debacle – lose faith in the stock market, reducing their exposure to equity in general. Complementing their results for retail investors, our work suggests that even highly sophisticated financial institutions – with potentially better access to information at their disposal – can be put off by financial misconduct; moreover, as we show, firm policies and even survival are affected by these perceptions.

Our analysis is particularly relevant for the growing literature on trust and social capital, particularly as it relates to financial transactions. Important contributions here include Putnam (1993), Knack and Keefer (1995), La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004).⁵ Most of this literature focuses on cross-country comparisons, finding that higher prevalence of corruption is associated with lower rates of investment and development. Our paper finds confirming evidence *within* the same (broad) legal environment and regulatory regime, and thus mitigates at least one of the important confounding factors that render identification difficult in existing studies.

⁵See also Mauro (1995), Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), and Glaeser and Saks (2006).

2 Data

2.1 Firm location

Our dataset includes firms headquartered in any of the twenty largest metropolitan areas in the United States. The specific variable we use is ADDZIP listed in COMPUSTAT, corresponding to the current zip code each firm’s headquarters or home office. Although this convention means that our dataset excludes firms once headquartered in one of our twenty areas but that now reside elsewhere, the fact that firms move so infrequently means that very few observations are lost.

The geographic unit we use is an “Economic Area,” as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. EAs are larger than metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), and are designed to capture regions within which workers commute. Examples of economic areas are Dallas-Arlington-Fort Worth, Washington D.C.-Columbia-Baltimore, and San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose. We use the term “area” and “city” interchangeably throughout the paper.

2.2 Financial misconduct

The primary source of our financial misconduct data is Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin (2012), hereafter KKLM, which details their hand-collection of over 10,000 events related to cases of corporate fraud and/or financial misconduct. KKLM aggregate information from four distinct but potentially correlated databases: 1) Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2) Audit Analytics (AA), 3) Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC), and 4) Securities and Exchange Commission’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). As the first two databases contain (mostly) information on “restatement” of corporate financial statements, they provide good indicators of firms’ attempts to manipulate earnings.⁶ The SCAC maintains a registry of Federal class action securities lawsuits; com-

⁶KKLM’s dataset distinguishes between intentional and unintentional errors by linking misstatements to subsequent SEC action. As KKLM describe in detail, up to roughly 80-90% of restatements are unintentional errors; therefore, they do not correspond to attempted financial fraud.

pared with the first GAO and AA datasets, this database reflects a wider variety of corporate misbehavior, which includes accounting fraud, fraudulent transfers in mergers and acquisition, misrepresentation, and insider trading. The AAER contains news releases announcing civil lawsuits brought by the SEC in federal court and other SEC’s orders/notices concerning the settlement of administrative proceedings. There is substantial overlap between all four datasets in terms of events covered and timing (see KKLM, section 2.3). We refer the reader interested in further detail (e.g., regarding the data collection method itself, comparison with other measures of fraud) to their paper.

A significant advantage of the KKLM data is that it distinguishes between dates when a firm commits fraud (the “violation period”) and the dates these actions became public (the “revelation period”). Most of our analysis will focus on the violation period, where we calculate the rate of fraud incidence within a given geographic area. In particular, we calculate the *CityFMRate* for each firm-year as the fraction of firms within the same economic areas (as defined above) but outside the firm’s Fama-French 48 industry classification that commit financial misconduct in that particular year.

Table 1 contains the summary statistics related to our regional fraud measure. Across all years and firms, the average value of *CityFMRate* is 1.58%. However, there is a large variation around this average. The intraquartile range is between 0.64% to 2.17%, and more than 5% of firm-years have no financial misconduct in the surrounding area. In most of our analysis, we employ the three-year moving average of this measure, and the corresponding indicator variable for firm-years in the top decile.

2.3 Corporate failures

Our analyses examine bankruptcy rates as a function of the financial misconduct of a firm’s local neighbors. Accordingly, Table 1 also shows the average rate at which firms declare bankruptcy and/or are delisted from public exchanges for financial reasons. Following Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), we use a broad definition of failure that includes financial-

related delistings. Typical financial reasons for delisting include bankruptcy, failures to pay exchange fees, or failures to maintain sufficient market capitalization or stock price. The average 1-year failure rate in our sample is 1.73%, which as we will discuss later, varies substantially over time and across cities and industries.

2.4 Loan level data

One part of this paper focuses on loan terms, which we obtain from DEALSCAN. This dataset contains information regarding syndicated bank loans, in which one or several lead arrangers assess the borrower’s credit quality, negotiate loan terms and conditions, and then attract additional syndicate members to provide portions of the loan financing under one set of contract. Dealscan reports various characteristics of each syndicated loan, including the loan spread (over LIBOR), various loan covenants that govern the terms for which default occurs or the contract is renegotiated between the borrower and its lenders, loan size, loan maturity, lead arrangers (and their locations), as well as syndicate members. The sample for our loan-level analysis is limited to firm-years during which we observe a syndicated bank loan.

Our analysis mostly considers the cost of credit –i.e., loan spreads; however, we also examine non-price components of debt contracts, i.e., loan covenants. As each syndicated loan contract potentially includes many distinct covenants, we employ the “strictness” measure proposed in Murfin (2012) to aggregate information from those covenants. This measure is intended to capture the (ex-ante) probability of covenant violations.⁷

2.5 Other variables

Our tests also employ a number of standard control variables, all of which are obtained from standard sources. Stock returns are from CRSP and firm fundamentals from COMPUSTAT. These variables include size (total assets), market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, in-

⁷For more details regarding the construction of this strictness measure, please see Murfin (2012).

vestment (CAPX/PPE), leverage (total liabilities over total assets), annual stock returns, standard deviation of returns, cash flow (EBITDA/PPE), and Tobin’s q (market value of equity minus book value of equity plus PPE, divided by PPE). The summary statistics are shown in Table 1. When we predict firm failure, we augment the bankruptcy model developed by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), and so Table 1 also reports our sample average for the additional variables used in their model.

3 Local corruption and access to credit

We begin by exploring the connection between regional waves of financial misconduct and the availability and prices of credit. Trust is especially important in debt contracts which, as their name suggests (“promissory” notes), represent a borrower’s promise to repay lent funds at some future date. And, while debt contracts typically include a number of provisions either restricting or verifying the borrower’s future actions – features intended to make default less likely or, should it occur, increase recovery – the inability to write complete contracts and information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders inevitably lead to situations where borrowers have an incentive to mislead lenders. In these situations, the behavior of the borrowers may be governed by ethical considerations and social penalties, which may differ from region to region, in conjunction with purely economic considerations.

We investigate the hypothesis that credit is more difficult to obtain in those regions where borrowers are more likely to act opportunistically in unfavorable states. First, we consider the quantity of debt. Here, we see a significant effect of regional misconduct on debt issuance. Second, we examine the terms for a particular kind of debt, syndicated bank loans, for which the pricing data is available on DEALSCAN. As we will see, credit spreads are higher when local rates of financial misconduct are higher, particularly when considering non-local banks.

3.1 Credit quantity

We start by examining the quantity of new debt issued by these firms following regional financial misconduct. Table 2 reports the results of logit regressions predicting security issuance. We measure net debt issuance as the change in debt liabilities in consecutive annual financial statements. Net equity issuance and net securities (debt plus equity) issuance are measured in similar fashion. We divide these variables by book asset so that they can be evaluated across firms.

The dependent variable in the first column is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm’s net debt issuance is more than 5% of book asset and 0 otherwise. This column shows that firms in areas with high regional financial misconduct rates are less likely to issue debt, after controlling for potential determinants of demand for financing (e.g., firm size, net income, cash holdings) as well as measures of default risk (e.g., leverage, stock volatility). The point estimate for *HighCityFM* in model (1) indicates that being located in a high fraud area reduces the probability of loan issuance by around 17 percent, which corresponds to about a 6.6 percentage point increase in debt issuance probability from the unconditional probability of around 39 percentage points.

Model (2) shows that the reduction in debt issuance is not offset by an increase in equity issuance. We find that being located in a ‘corrupt’ location reduces the probability of raising a large amount of capital by around 11 percent. Moreover, when we focus on the subset of firms that do raise a large amount of external capital –for whom the benefits of obtaining external funding are presumably higher than the corresponding costs– in models (3) and (4), we observe a lower likelihood of a debt issuance.

The debt reduction corresponding to regional financial misconduct is potentially consistent with two effects: decreases in loan demand by local firms or reductions in loan supply to these firms (as we hypothesize). In the next section, we examine the pricing of loans obtained by area firms following regional financial misconduct. Supply-driven decrease in credit quantity predicts a higher pricing, while demand-driven decrease predicts the opposite

or no effect on pricing.

3.2 Credit pricing

To examine loan pricing, we focus on a subset of corporate credit facilities: syndicated bank loans. We choose these loans because their pricing data is available on DEALSCAN. Table 3 presents the results of OLS regressions, in which the dependent variable is the spread (over LIBOR) a firm pays on syndicated bank credit, including any fees. In a syndicated loan, the debt contract is between a borrower and multiple banks, each of whom contribute a portion of the lent funds. Typically, a single “lead arranger” sets deal terms, and interacts directly with the borrower during the underwriting process. Occasionally, syndicated loans are originated using co-lead arrangers.

Firm-level control variables in Table 3 include credit ratings, firm size (total asset), net income, leverage, cash holdings, stock returns, stock price, volatility, and market-to-book ratio. We also include several loan characteristics: the average maturity, the size of the loan, and two indicator variables capturing whether the lender is based in the U.S. and whether the lead arranger is a large commercial lender (i.e., Citigroup, JP Morgan, or Bank of America), respectively. To control for potential variation in loan spreads due to economic and industry conditions, we subtract the industry-year average from the dependent variable. In all of our regressions, we also control for city-level economic condition variables, i.e., multiple lags of population and employment growth rates, to control for potential variation in economic condition that may drive both the dependent variable as well as the independent city-level variables of interest.

The main independent variable of interest is the financial misconduct in the city where the firm is headquartered. To capture non-linearities in the relation between loan pricing and regional financial misconduct, we use the same parametrization for city-level misconduct in which we employ a dummy variable, *High City FM*, which takes a value of one for firms located in a city whose average financial misconduct rate over the preceding 3 years is in

the top decile (roughly, greater than 2%). Here, we see that after controlling for other firm, industry, and loan-level determinants of credit spreads, being headquartered in a high-FM area is associated with around 7 percent increase in interest rates. Against an average spread of 175 basis points, this represents an increase of about 12 basis points. In sum, our evidence indicates that the credit reduction in high misconduct regions is likely to be driven by credit rationing by credit suppliers rather than the reduction in demand for credit.

It is worth noting that these effects are estimated after controlling for credit ratings. One interpretation is that the rating agencies do not fully incorporate the impact of local fraud waves into their credit models. However, it should be noted that credit ratings tend to reflect the risks of a firm’s publicly traded bonds, which have different risk characteristics (and different recovery rates in the event of default) than the bank debt we analyze.⁸

4 Implications for firm investment and hiring choices

This section examines how local rates of financial misconduct affect a firm’s investment and employment choices. We are particularly interested in industries suffering downturns since firms in these industries are likely to be more scrutinized by lenders. Our conjecture is that these firms are likely to be especially scrutinized in regions with higher rates of financial misconduct. As a result, firms in these regions, that also have insufficient internally generated funds (or cash on hand), will invest less and increase employment less than their counterparts in regions with lower rates of financial misconduct. In other words, our focus is on a triple interaction that includes a proxy for industry fundamentals (whether or not the industry is in a downturn), financial constraints, and the rate of financial misconduct in the region.

To proxy for industry fundamentals, we use the level of industry investment (or em-

⁸In an unreported analyses, we examine whether local waves of financial misconduct affect loan covenants. Using the “strictness” measure proposed in Murfin (2012) to aggregate information from various covenants, we find no evidence that covenant strictness is affected by regional financial misconduct. This “no result” is potentially due to the limited size of our covenant sample.

ployment in the employment regressions). To proxy for financial constraints we use the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index of financial constraints, as described by Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001). Intuitively, the KZ index maps firm attributes like dividend payout ratios and cash balances to management discussion indicating financial constraints. We focus on the top decile of firms in the KZ index, comprised mostly of firms categorized as “constrained” or “likely constrained.”⁹

4.1 Capital expenditures

We first consider whether a firm’s capital expenditures are related to local waves of financial misconduct, estimating the following model of investment:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta Investment_{j,t}^{i,a} = & \alpha + \beta_1 HighIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a} + \beta_2 LowIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a} + \quad (1) \\
& \beta_3 ConstrainedFirm + \beta_4 LowIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a} \cdot ConstrainedFirm + \\
& \beta_5 HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a} + \\
& \beta_6 HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a} \cdot HighIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a} + \\
& \beta_7 HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a} \cdot LowIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a} + \\
& + \beta_8 HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a} \cdot ConstrainedFirm + \\
& + \beta_9 HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a} \cdot LowIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a} \cdot ConstrainedFirm + \\
& + \beta_{10} \Delta CashFlow_{j,t}^{i,a} + \beta_{11} \Delta q_{j,t}^{i,a} + \epsilon_{j,t}^{i,a}.
\end{aligned}$$

The dependent variable, $\Delta Investment_{j,t}^{i,a}$, is the annual change in firm j ’s ratio of capital expenditures to lagged total assets, from $t - 1$ to t . As before, i indicates industry and a

⁹Studying low-dividend firms, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify “54.5 percent of firm-years as not (NFC) and 30.9 percent of firm-years as likely not financially constrained (LNFC) for a total of 85.3 percent of firm-years in which [they] find no evidence of financing constraints that restrict investment” (emphasis theirs). Out of the remaining 14.7 percent of low-dividend firm-years, they classify “7.3 percent as possibly constrained, 4.8 percent as likely constrained, and 2.6 percent as definitely constrained.” Since our sample includes high-dividend firms (which are less likely to be constrained), we use a more stringent cutoff of the top decile.

geographic area.

As described above, our focus is on the differential sensitivity to negative industry shocks, between firms headquartered in cities with high versus low rates of financial misconduct. We measure positive and negative industry shocks with dummy variables $HighIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a}$ and $LowIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a}$ respectively. The first takes a value of one if industry-level (i) investment growth, measured outside ($-a$) firm j 's area is in the top quartile (above 1%; 5.4% on average), and the second if sector-wide investment is in the bottom quartile (below -7.5%; -14.1% on average). Coefficients β_1 and β_2 thus capture the average sensitivity to industry-wide increases and decreases of this magnitude. The intercept, α , captures the effect of all other years, when investment growth (or shrinkage) in firm j 's industry is fairly modest.

The next terms in Equation (1) tell us whether financially constrained firms, defined as those in the top decile of the KZ index, cut investment more sharply during industry declines. To save space, we do not include the interaction between $HighIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a}$ and $ConstrainedFirm$, but note that it is (as expected) insignificant in all specifications.

The main variable of interest is an indicator for a high rate of local financial misconduct in the preceding year ($t = 1$), $HighCityFM_{p,t-1}^{-i,a}$, measured in the firm's headquarter area (a), but outside its industry ($-i$). As in prior specifications, this variable takes a value of one for city-year observations ranking in the top quartile, in the distribution of all city years. Among these variables, our primary interest is the triple interaction, $HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a} \cdot LowIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a} \cdot ConstrainedFirm$. The coefficient β_9 tells us whether constrained firms with poor industry fundamentals suffer disproportionately when headquartered in an area characterized by high rates of financial misconduct. To avoid confounding effects, Equation (1) also includes $HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a}$ by itself (β_5), its interaction with the high (β_6) and low (β_7) industry level investment variables, and an interaction between $ConstrainedFirm$ and $HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a}$ (β_8).

Finally, in some specifications (for reasons we discuss below), we follow the existing

literature and include as covariates changes in *Cashflow* and q , traditionally identified determinants of corporate investment. Their effects are captured, respectively, by coefficients β_{10} and β_{11} in Equation (1).

Table 4 shows the results. The first column includes only the high and low industry dummy variables, as well as an indicator for a high city-level rate of financial misconduct. As expected, both industry variables are highly significant, and with the expected signs. The coefficient on $HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a}$ is not significant on its own, indicating that local rates of financial misconduct do not have a material impact on investment growth for the typical firm. The second column adds *ConstrainedFirm*, where we see that firms likely to be financially constrained experience investment cuts of around 2.22% per annum ($t = -3.97$).

The next two columns incorporate interaction terms involving $HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a}$. In column three, we see that neither interaction with $HighIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a}$ or $LowIndustryInvestment_{p,t}^{i,-a}$ is statistically significant. However, when we distinguish between constrained and unconstrained firms in column 4, a different picture emerges. The coefficient on the triple interaction, β_8 is negative and significant, with a point estimate of -11.29 ($t = -2.38$). To put this magnitude in perspective, note that it is roughly equivalent to the coefficient on the *LowIndustry* dummy, implying that financially constrained firms in high-FM regions cut investment by almost twice as much in response to downturns.

The final specification (in columns 5 and 6) includes changes in the firm's own q (lagged one year) and *CashFlow*. We do this for the sake of consistency with the previous literature. We expect that q , which may reflect the negative impact of being located in a corrupt city should weaken the relation between financial misconduct and investment. Yet, the significance of cash flow and q and similarity of the other coefficients between the last and penultimate column suggests that this is not the case. The specification in column 6 adds controls for local economic conditions; the estimates do not materially change.

4.2 Employment

Table 5 addresses the same question, but considers employment rather than capital expenditures. Accordingly, we make two changes. First, the dependent variable, $\Delta Employment_{j,t}^{i,a}$, is now the percentage change in firm j 's number of employees (COMPUSTAT variable EMP), from $t-1$ to t , scaled by lagged assets. Second, the industry-level dummy variables are defined using sector wide changes in employment. As before, *High (Low) Industry Employment* are dummy variables for the top (bottom) quartile of year-over-year employment growth at the industry level. These thresholds are, respectively, about 9% and 2%.

In the first column, we see that, as expected, firms cut employees during industry declines and add them in industry booms. On average, during industry-level employment booms, employment growth is about nine percent higher than average; in contrast, employment growth shrinks by five percent during industry slowdowns. Both results are highly significant. Column 1 also shows that unconditionally, spikes in regional financial misconduct are not associated with layoffs for nearby headquartered companies. The next column mirrors the analysis of capital expenditures, indicating that constrained firms, regardless of headquarter location, experience slower employment growth (-4.95%, $t = -9.53$), relative to their unconstrained peers.

As before, neither interaction between $HighCityFM_{p,t}^{-i,a}$ and the industry dummies is significant on average (column three), but when we focus specifically on constrained firms in columns four and five, we find significant results, both economically and statistically. In column 5, which includes q and *Cashflow* (both of which are highly significant), the coefficient on the triple interaction is -2.92 ($t = -1.97$). Thus, compared to constrained firms headquartered in less corrupt areas, the effect of an industry downturn is magnified by about 50%, increasing from $-5.75 + 2.45 \approx -3.30\%$ to $-5.75 + 2.45 + 1.06 - 2.92 \approx -5.16\%$.

It is tempting to use these results to make causal inferences between regional corruption and its implication for the local economy. However, recall that because we are using COMPUSTAT to measure employment, it is impossible to distinguish between a firm lay-

ing off workers (or at least hiring at a lower rate) at headquarters versus other locations where it may have operations. To see the issue, consider the example of Detroit-based retailer Kmart’s admission of financial fraud in 2001. Table 5 examines employment growth for nearby-headquartered firms in different sectors, such as Ann Arbor’s Domino’s Pizza. However, because the vast majority of Domino’s employees are based elsewhere, it is unclear whether Kmart’s financial misconduct matters much for the local Detroit economy.

Together, the results in this section indicate that constrained firms headquartered in areas characterized by high rates of corporate corruption fare especially poorly during industry downturns. Tables 4 and 5 suggest that investment and employment suffers disproportionately during these downturns. The next section extends this analysis even further, testing for a link between local misconduct waves and corporate failures.

5 Do financial misconduct rates predict bankruptcy?

In sections 3 and 4, we established that being located in a corrupt city affects a firm’s ability to raise capital, which can in turn affect its ability to grow, as evidenced by its capital expenditures and the growth in employment. In this final section, we extend our analysis to consider the geographic clustering of corporate bankruptcies, and their link to waves of financial misconduct. We begin by documenting that bankruptcies have a strong regional component in section 5.1, finding that average failure rates differ substantially between cities, and over time within these cities. Section 5.2 then considers one particularly regional factor – spikes in financial misconduct – that partly explain these regional differences in bankruptcy.

5.1 Regional patterns in corporate bankruptcy

Although we are primarily interested in the relation between regional misconduct and failure risk, we are unaware of evidence of geographical patterns in bankruptcy. Therefore, before exploring the impact of local misconduct, we take a brief step back and characterize some

basic cross-sectional and time series patterns in corporate failures over the past four decades.

To start, consider Figure 2, which plots as a heat map the average bankruptcy rates for firms in each of our twenty cities. Darker and/or larger circles represent higher average failure rates, with firms headquartered in cities such as Denver (3.01%), Dallas (2.01%), and Miami (3.26%) declaring bankruptcy more often than average, and those in Indianapolis (1.21%), Philadelphia (1.09%), and Cleveland (0.88%) doing so much less often.¹⁰ To save space, we do not tabulate the results, but in linear probability models of firm failure, city fixed effects are (jointly) highly significant.

In addition to these average cross-sectional differences, cities tend to experience waves of corporate failures, much in the same way that financial misconduct exhibits regional ebbs and flows. In Table 6, we show this formally, adapting the logit model of firm failure developed by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), adding to their list of predictors the rate of financial misconduct of a firm’s geographic neighbors.¹¹ These predictors are the natural logarithm of the firm’s market-to-book ratio, net income, book leverage, one-year lagged stock return, cash balance, stock price, one-year trailing stock return volatility, and the natural logarithm of total assets.

Our main interest is in whether, after controlling for these known determinants of firm failure, bankruptcies tend to cluster regionally. To allow for a potentially non-linear relation, we allow for the bankruptcy rates of a firm’s non-industry, regional peers to enter through a series of dummy variables: an indicator for exactly zero bankruptcies in the year of interest, another indicator for area bankruptcy rates in the range (0%, 1.5%], one for (1.5%, 3%], and one if the local bankruptcy rate exceeds 3%. In all regressions, the omitted dummy is the

¹⁰Some of the cross-sectional variation shown in Figure 2 may capture differences in failure rates combined with industry clustering; however, the figure is remarkably similar if we instead use industry adjusted averages.

¹¹Because firms declare bankruptcy only once, the probability of failing in any year t is conditional upon survival (i.e., having not declared bankruptcy in year $t - 1$, $t - 2$, etc.). This induces serial correlation in the residuals, biasing the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. While hazard models are designed to take this serial dependence into account, alternative possibilities include either logit or linear probability models, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. See Shumway (2001) for more discussion of this issue. The results in Table 6 are very similar with either alternative.

first category, and to ensure that we are capturing time-series variation within regions, we include the average bankruptcy rate for each of the twenty cities in our sample (e.g., 3.26% for Miami).¹²

In the first column, we see that compared to the omitted category of zero regional bankruptcies in the year t , firms with at least one bankruptcy in the area are $e^{0.93} \approx 2.53$ times as likely to declare failure. Taking the failure probability of the omitted group of 0.44% as a baseline, having at least one local bankruptcy increases the chance of failure by 0.67% to 1.11%.

Columns 2 and 3 indicate a concave relation between a firm’s failure probability and the failure rates of its local neighbors. In the second column, we split the space of positive local bankruptcy rates into two mutually exclusive regions: strictly positive but below 1.5%, and 1.5% or above. Comparing the coefficients indicates that the first few bankruptcies in a region have the biggest impact (almost doubling the baseline failure rate), with higher failure incidence mattering proportionately less (a further increase of about 47%). The final column continues this exercise, distinguishing between the regions (1.5%, 3.0%] and $> 3\%$. Progressing through each region, a higher failure rate of one’s neighbors monotonically increases a firm’s failure rate, although increases matter less and less. In the highest group, where at least 3% of a firm’s neighbors have committed bankruptcy in a given year, the firm’s probability of failing itself is $e^{64+.30+.18} \approx 3.06$ times the baseline, or an increase of 0.90 percentage points.

5.2 Local financial misconduct and corporate bankruptcy

While evidence of regional bankruptcy clustering can arise for a number of reasons, we focus on regional waves of financial misconduct as a potential risk factor for firm failure. The heart of our argument is simply an extension of the results documented in Sections 3 and

¹²Due to the incidental parameters problem first described by Neyman and Scott (1948) –but see also Lancaster (2000) and Greene (2002), city fixed effects will not be estimated consistently in non-linear models such as hazard or logit specifications. However, linear probability models (which are estimated consistently), give very similar results to those presented in Table 6.

4: proximity to financial misconduct decreases the availability of external finance, elevating the bankruptcy risk for the most financially vulnerable firms.

As we showed earlier in Figure 1, cities with high average rates of financial misconduct (measured from 1970-2010) tend to have high average rates of corporate failure. The three cities that we mention in the previous subsection as examples of cities with low bankruptcy rates (i.e., Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Indianapolis) are in the bottom five of financial misconduct rates, while the three cities with high bankruptcy rates (i.e., Dallas, Denver, and Miami) are in the top five of financial misconduct rates. The strength of this relation is remarkable, with only twenty data points (one for each city) generating a highly significant relation (slope=0.85, $t = 3.61$).

One potential objection to Figure 1 is that it simply reflects the tendency of firms prosecuted for financial misconduct to subsequently declare bankruptcy, so that the averages shown on the x - and y -axes are mechanically related.¹³ However, this issue is eliminated by how the averages in Figure 1 are calculated. The x -axis represents city-level average financial misconduct rates, ignoring any firms that, at any point in the sample period, declare bankruptcy.

Another concern pertaining to the interpretation of Figure 1 is that bankruptcy and financial misconduct rates are co-determined by longstanding local factors, such as differences in the strength of local institutions (e.g., courts). While we cannot eliminate this concern entirely, examination of the time series mitigates the impact of relatively static influences, such as long-lived differences in demographics, “culture,” tolerance of corruption, and so on. We present the results of this analysis in Table 7, where we relate the probability of a firm declaring bankruptcy to local measures of recent financial misconduct. Importantly, this analysis controls for the average probability of financial misconduct within each city, so that the estimates presented are identified from time series variation in financial misconduct and

¹³As an extreme example of the concern, imagine that bankruptcy in year t occurs if, and only if, the firm is guilty of financial misconduct in year t . Here, city-level rates of financial misconduct and bankruptcy will be identical.

corporate failure within cities.

In the first column, we again start with Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi’s (2008) failure model, and add to it the three-year moving average rate of financial misconduct in the city. In particular, $HighCityFM_{p,t-1}^{a,-i}$ takes a value of one if the average financial misconduct rate in the city over the past three years ranks in the top decile (above 2% annually), and 0 otherwise. As before superscript a refers to one of the twenty economic areas, and $-i$ specifies that financial misconduct is calculated outside the firm’s Fama-French 48 industry classification. Subscript p stands for the “portfolio” of local firms which, on average, contains roughly 130 companies. The coefficient (0.176, $t = 2.06$) indicates a bankruptcy odds ratio that is about $e^{0.176} - 1 \approx 19\%$ higher (about 0.26 percentage points) when $HighCityFM_{p,t-1}^{a,-i} = 1$, evaluated when all controls are at their sample means.

Given that we already know from Table 6 that bankruptcies tend to cluster regionally, it is natural to question whether the relation between city-level financial misconduct and bankruptcy shown in Table 7 represents a distinct finding. In column 2, we include as a predictor $HighCityBankruptcy_{p,t-1}^{-i,a}$, a dummy variable that takes a value of one if last year’s ($t - 1$) rate of bankruptcy in firm j ’s area (a) was above 3 percentage points. The portfolio (p) of these firms are constructed outside the firm’s Fama-French 48 industry ($-i$). A comparison of columns 2 and 3 in Table 7 indicates that accounting for a high rate of local firm failure ($> 3\%$) does not reduce the effect of city-level financial misconduct, as the coefficient on $HighCityFM$ remains highly significant (0.19, $t = 2.25$).

The final four columns account for time-series variation in bankruptcy rates for a number of relevant portfolios. Like we did for city-level bankruptcy in column 2, column 3 includes the same dummy variable, but for firms in the same Fama-French industry (i), but outside the area ($-a$). Likewise, column 4 considers firms in the same region (a) and industry (i). Column 5 accounts for spikes in market-wide bankruptcy not otherwise accounted for in these other portfolios. Lastly, column 6 includes city-level economic condition measures. Our objective with all these controls is to ensure that our identification of any effect for

city-level financial misconduct is distinct from any existing time-series and cross-regional trends in firm failure. The stability of the coefficient across all specifications suggests that this is the case.

Our conclusion is that although local waves of misconduct appear to partly explain the regional clustering of corporate bankruptcy, the majority of the regional effect remains unexplained. We view the identification of these local factors as interesting avenues for future research.

6 Conclusion

As any traveler knows, urban areas have distinct cultures that describe the behavior of their residents. New Yorkers are stereotypically aggressive and impatient, Bostonians smart and educated, Minnesotans wholesome and family-oriented, and Seattleites bookish and melancholy. In some cases, even proper identities have emerged: residents of Missouri (the “show me” state) are notoriously skeptical, whereas Texas’s monicker, the Lone Star State, reflects its fiercely independent nature. Although the reasons for these differences are complex and multifaceted – explanations often invoke geography, institutions, genetics, and even serendipity – the result is a heterogeneous distribution that provides a useful laboratory for studying the relation between cultural attributes and other outcomes of interest.

In this study, we are interested in the extent to which general perceptions of trust – the belief in one’s counter party to fulfill an obligation – influences the availability and terms of financing. Whereas the average trustworthiness of residents and/or corporate managers likely differs appreciably across cities, and presumably permits cross-sectional comparisons, the presence of other slow-moving regional factors renders this source of variation less than ideal from an identification standpoint. Therefore, this paper exploits time-series variation in financial misconduct within cities. Specifically, we examine whether such regional fraud “waves” cast a shadow over an entire region, making it difficult for resident firms – even

those not implicated themselves – to access credit. For the most financially vulnerable, this can adversely influence firm policy and, in extreme cases, even survival.

Our primary findings are as follows:

1. Following regional increases in financial misconduct, local firms raise less debt (as a percentage of assets) and less external capital in general.
2. Following regional increases in financial misconduct, credit market conditions tighten for borrowers headquartered in the region. Spreads for syndicated loans are about 7 basis points higher.
3. The effects of financial misconduct on financial market conditions has real effects on investment and employment. This is especially the case for financially constrained firms in declining industries, which tend to raise less capital, and exhibit declines in investment and employment relative to their counterparts in regions with less financial misconduct.
4. Firms are more likely to go bankrupt, in the three years following a spike in regional misconduct.

Taken together, this evidence suggests that because a firm's location can affect how it is perceived by lenders, its location can have a profound effect on its real decisions and ultimately its survival. Our evidence also provides support for the more general idea that trust and reputation considerations play important roles for firms that need to raise external capital. In these and many other situations, higher levels of trust reduce deadweight costs (e.g., writing more complete contracts or enforcing them), and allow resources to be directed to more productive activities.

While our focus has been on the perceptions and the responses of lenders, one might expect regional spikes in financial misconduct to illicit similar responses from a firm's non-financial stakeholders. For example, workers asked to develop firm-specific human capital

are implicitly entering into an implicit contract, and like creditors, are potentially exposed to losses should the firm deviate from a promised strategy. Indeed, while we attributed the observed link between regional employment growth and financial misconduct to the financial challenges facing local firms, it could also be caused, at least in part, by the reluctance of workers to join firms they perceive as less credible and/or trustworthy (as discussed in Titman (1984)).

Finally, it should be noted that while we have identified an important component of regional culture, as measured by the rate of financial misconduct, our measure probably captures only a small part of what makes regions distinct. Indeed, although financial misconduct is likely to be most important for the financially constrained and distressed firms that we focus on, it only partially explains the observed geographical clustering of bankruptcies. Identifying other urban characteristics that can contribute to the success and failure of its residents is likely to be a promising area for future research.

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Figure 1: Corporate Fraud and Failure Rates

This figure reports the scatterplot of city-level financial misconduct and corporate failure rates over our entire sample. The straight line depicts the best-fit line.




Figure 2: Heat Map of Corporate Failure Rate

This figure reports the geographical distribution of city-level corporate failure rates over our entire sample.




Table 1: Summary Statistics

This table contains summary statistics of firms in our sample. City-Level FM Rate is the average fraud rate for the city, i.e., the number of non-industry firms in the city committing financial misconduct, divided by the number of non-industry firms headquartered in the city. Bankrupt (Next Year) is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the firm experience default or delisting due to performance issues in the following year, and zero otherwise. Bankrupt (in 3 Years) is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the firm experience default or delisting due to performance issues in the following 3 years, and zero otherwise. We report summary statistics of the panel data. Panel A reports the statistics for the full-sample analysis, while Panel B reports the statistics for the sample of loan issuers

Panel A										
Variable	N/Year	5th Pctl	25th Pctl	Median	75th Pctl	95th Pctl	Mean	Std Dev		
City-Level FM Rate (Fraud/# Firm)	2,904.76	0	0.62%	1.37%	2.17%	4.20%	1.58%	1.36%		
City-Level FM Rate (over 3 Years)	2,904.76	0	0.55%	1.22%	1.92%	3.77%	1.41%	1.21%		
Net Debt Issuance (divided by book asset)	2,904.76	-22.64%	-3.32%	2.24%	9.55%	33.41%	2.45%	44.97%		
Net Debt Issuance >5%	2,904.76	0	0	0	1	1	36.07%	48.02%		
Net (Debt+Equity) Issuance >5%	2,904.76	0	0	0	1	1	47.32%	49.93%		
Net Debt Iss. >5% or Net Equity Iss. >5%	2,904.76	0	0	1	1	1	50.60%	50.00%		
Change in Investment Rate	2,904.76	-79.45%	-12.10%	-0.62%	7.90%	54.42%	-4.33%	55.02%		
Change in Employment	2,904.76	-64.70%	-8.48%	2.03%	15.15%	63.70%	2.06%	29.66%		
Bankrupt (Next Year)	2,904.76	0	0	0	0	0	1.74%	13.08%		
Asset (in M)	2,904.76	4.88	30.86	137.95	709.23	8,316.66	1,877.06	6,820.07		
Market Cap (in M)	2,904.76	3.95	24.07	101.13	509.46	5,149.90	1,130.25	3,701.27		
M/B	2,904.76	0.50	1.06	1.74	3.09	9.02	2.86	3.60		
Investment / PPE	2,904.76	3.55%	12.67%	23.97%	45.43%	132.83%	39.92%	50.46%		
Book Leverage	2,904.76	3.95%	17.05%	37.38%	62.52%	89.93%	41.16%	27.44%		
Annual Return (Last Year)	2,904.76	-62.11%	-22.73%	5.86%	38.56%	137.34%	16.70%	64.67%		
Annual Return (This Year)	2,904.76	-67.81%	-26.92%	3.66%	36.84%	133.33%	13.59%	65.17%		
Std. Deviation of Daily Return	2,904.76	1.21%	2.12%	3.17%	4.70%	8.27%	3.71%	2.27%		
Cash Flow / PPE	2,904.76	-538.69%	1.76%	30.03%	79.06%	339.73%	-12.61%	394.23%		
Lagged Q	2,904.76	0.00	1.07	2.78	10.30	74.83	11.16	19.15		
Net Income / Asset	2,904.76	-28.28%	-2.63%	1.73%	4.18%	8.04%	-3.00%	27.36%		
Cash Holdings / Asset	2,904.76	0.29%	1.87%	5.53%	13.59%	39.77%	11.07%	16.61%		
Log(Price)	2,904.76	-0.29	1.39	2.40	2.71	2.71	1.91	1.07		

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Panel B									
	N/Year	5th Pctl	25th Pctl	Median	75th Pctl	95th Pctl	Mean	Std Dev		
Spread (in bps)	292.91	25	75	150	255	405	178.09	128.49		
Loan Maturity	292.91	11	23	36	60	81	41.59	77.94		
Log (Loan Size)	292.91	15.42	17.22	18.66	20.03	21.73	18.62	1.96		
US Lender Dummy	292.91	0	1	1	1	1	94.37%	23.05%		
Large Lender Dummy (Citi/JP/BoA)	292.91	0	0	0	1	1	34.56%	47.56%		
Log (Size)	292.91	9.37	11.27	12.82	14.42	16.50	12.87	2.20		
Net Income/Asset	292.91	-17.29%	-0.38%	2.47%	3.97%	6.98%	-0.72%	16.47%		
Debt/Asset	292.91	8.56%	25.01%	40.97%	59.52%	82.41%	42.74%	22.59%		
Stock Return	292.91	-0.64	-0.20	0.08	0.40	1.35	0.19	0.73		
Cash/Asset	292.91	0.18%	0.98%	2.88%	7.31%	21.82%	5.94%	9.07%		
Log(PPrice)	292.91	0.50	1.96	2.71	2.71	2.71	2.22	0.80		
Volatility	292.91	1.32%	2.08%	2.96%	4.27%	7.06%	3.46%	2.24%		
Log (M/B)	292.91	-0.53	0.24	0.69	1.21	2.08	0.73	0.82		
Bond Rating Available	292.91	0	0	0	1	1	31.34%	46.39%		
Bond Rating (1-22)	92.22	5	7	10	13	15	9.97	3.53		

Table 2: Regional Financial Misconduct and Supply of Credit

This table contains the parameter estimates of logit regressions predicting security issuance. The dependent variables are the following indicator variables: $Debt > 5\%$, which takes the value of 1 if the firm's net debt issuance is more than 5% of book asset and 0 otherwise; or $(D + E) > 5\%$, which takes the value of 1 if the firm's combined net debt and equity issuance is more than 5% of book asset, and 0 otherwise. In model (3), we limit the sample to firms whose net debt issuance *or* net equity issuance is more than 5% of book asset. In model (4), we limit the sample to firms whose net security (i.e., debt *plus* equity) issuance is more than 5% of book asset, i.e., if the indicator variable $(D + E) > 5\%$ equals to 1. *High City FM* takes the value of 1 if the city-level financial misconduct rate (calculated outside the firm's FF48 industry) over the past 3 years is in the top decile. All models include city-level economic condition variables (i.e., 3 year averages of employment and population growth rates). The *t*-stats in parentheses are calculated by clustering errors at the firm level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable:	Debt > 5%	(D+E) > 5%	Debt > 5%	Debt > 5%
Sample:	All Firms	All Firms	Debt > 5% or Equity > 5%	(D+E) > 5%
High City FM Dummy	-0.17*** (-6.00)	-0.11*** (-3.76)	-0.24*** (-5.97)	-0.14*** (-3.40)
Log(MV)	-0.06*** (-10.29)	-0.08*** (-11.74)	-0.03*** (-3.52)	-0.08*** (-8.72)
Lagged Return	0.13*** (11.76)	0.30*** (21.41)	-0.00 (-0.10)	0.00 (0.49)
Log(M/B)	0.53*** (35.91)	0.64*** (34.49)	0.08*** (4.40)	0.22*** (10.57)
Net Income	-0.24*** (-6.37)	-0.87*** (-10.72)	0.27*** (2.84)	0.29*** (3.79)
Leverage	1.97*** (37.39)	0.85*** (14.25)	3.56*** (41.08)	3.86*** (41.25)
Cash	-0.97*** (-12.77)	-0.81*** (-11.17)	-1.07*** (-9.74)	-0.88*** (-7.85)
Volatility	-1.07*** (-2.76)	2.46*** (5.63)	-7.85*** (-12.35)	-3.71*** (-6.04)
Price	0.15*** (12.94)	0.16*** (11.20)	0.24*** (12.42)	0.13*** (7.35)
Constant	-1.12*** (-16.89)	-0.22*** (-2.98)	0.22** (2.06)	0.43*** (3.92)
City Economic Condition Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	81,233	81,233	43,241	41,070
Pseudo R^2	0.055	0.067	0.138	0.120

Table 3: Regional Financial Misconduct and Credit Spreads

This table contains the parameter estimates of regressions predicting loan spread. The dependent variable is the log of loan spread, adjusted by the average of other loans taken by firms in the same FF48 industry in the same calendar year. The main independent variable of interest is *High City FM* takes the value of 1 if the city-level financial misconduct rate (calculated outside the firm's FF48 industry) over the past 3 years is in the top decile, and 0 otherwise. All firm-level control variables are calculated at the end of the previous year. All models include city fixed effects, model 1 includes year and rating FE, models 2 and 3 include year*rating FE, and model 3 includes time-varying city-level economic condition variables (i.e., 3 year averages of employment and population growth rates). The *t*-stats are reported in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent Variable:	Industry-adjusted Log(Spread)		
High City FM Dummy	0.0762*** (2.82)	0.0666** (2.43)	0.0723*** (2.59)
Log (Size)	-0.1627*** (-23.64)	-0.1625*** (-23.27)	-0.1626*** (-23.28)
Net Income/Asset	-0.1640*** (-3.28)	-0.1629*** (-3.27)	-0.1626*** (-3.26)
Debt/Asset	0.6362*** (15.71)	0.6371*** (15.55)	0.6374*** (15.56)
Stock Return	-0.0123 (-1.09)	-0.0102 (-0.88)	-0.0100 (-0.86)
Cash/Asset	0.2125*** (2.73)	0.2162*** (2.77)	0.2150*** (2.76)
Price	0.0231 (1.60)	0.0203 (1.39)	0.0204 (1.40)
Volatility	3.2402*** (6.78)	3.2753*** (6.79)	3.2746*** (6.79)
Log (M/B)	0.0595*** (5.32)	0.0586*** (5.15)	0.0586*** (5.14)
Loan Maturity	-0.0001 (-0.71)	-0.0001 (-0.77)	-0.0001 (-0.78)
Log (Loan Size)	-0.0612*** (-9.58)	-0.0622*** (-9.56)	-0.0623*** (-9.56)
US Lender Dummy	0.0564* (1.88)	0.0580* (1.89)	0.0584* (1.90)
Large Lender Dummy (Citi/JP/BoA)	-0.0818*** (-5.10)	-0.0786*** (-4.80)	-0.0782*** (-4.78)
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes		
Rating FE	Yes		
Year*Rating FE		Yes	Yes
City Economic Conditions Variables			Yes
Observations	7,050	7,050	7,050
R^2	0.525	0.552	0.552

Table 4: Investment Plans of Constrained Firms in High Financial Misconduct Regions

This table contains the parameter estimates of regressions predicting the change in investment rates. The dependent variable is the change in investment rate, calculated as the ratio of CAPX to lagged PPE. The independent variables include indicator variables capturing the level of the dependent variable at the industry level: *High Industry* takes the value of 1 if the industry-average change in investment rate is in the top quartile; and *Low Industry* takes the value of 1 if the industry-average change in investment rate is in the bottom quartile. *High City FM* takes the value of 1 if the city-level financial misconduct rate (calculated outside the firm's FF48 industry) over the past 3 years is in the top decile, and 0 otherwise. *Constrained* takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the top decile of the Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index, and 0 otherwise. Model 6 include city-level economic condition variables (i.e., 3 year averages of employment and population growth rates). The *t*-stats in parentheses are calculated by clustering errors in two dimensions: firm level and year level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable:	Change in Investment Rate					
High Industry Investment	9.54*** (17.30)	9.41*** (16.62)	9.47*** (17.06)	9.47*** (17.07)	9.10*** (21.37)	9.13*** (19.99)
Low Industry Investment	-12.23*** (-9.54)	-11.85*** (-9.82)	-11.48*** (-10.72)	-11.42*** (-10.89)	-12.03*** (-11.56)	-11.97*** (-11.77)
Constrained		-2.18*** (-3.97)	-2.18*** (-3.97)	-1.95*** (-2.59)	-2.41*** (-2.98)	-2.48*** (-3.04)
Low Industry * Constrained				-0.52 (-0.31)	0.32 (0.19)	0.32 (0.19)
High City FM	0.02 (0.03)	-0.09 (-0.13)	1.08*** (2.75)	0.67 (1.47)	0.41 (0.63)	0.43 (0.66)
High City FM * High Industry Investment			-0.67 (-0.58)	-0.62 (-0.55)	-1.75 (-1.63)	-1.93* (-1.82)
High City FM * Low Industry Investment			-3.40 (-1.62)	-1.83 (-1.00)	-1.86 (-1.35)	-1.81 (-1.36)
High City FM * Constrained				3.31** (2.37)	4.34*** (3.50)	4.42*** (3.60)
High City FM * Low Ind. Inv. * Constrained				-11.29** (-2.38)	-10.98** (-2.38)	-11.00** (-2.39)
Laq Q					0.21*** (12.75)	0.21*** (12.55)
CF					0.64*** (4.27)	0.63*** (4.24)
Constant	-3.16*** (-17.78)	-2.74*** (-13.83)	-2.85*** (-14.82)	-2.87*** (-14.73)	-5.14*** (-13.93)	-4.92*** (-10.17)
City Economic Conditions Variables						Yes
Observations	84,932	79,348	79,348	79,348	78,545	76,984
R ²	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.039	0.039

Table 5: Employment Plans of Constrained Firms in High Financial Misconduct Regions

This table contains the parameter estimates of regressions predicting the growth in firm employment. The dependent variable is the rate of change of employment, calculated as the ratio of change in the number of employees to lagged asset. The independent variables include indicator variables capturing the level of the dependent variable at the industry level: *High Industry Employment* takes the value of 1 if the industry-average change in employment is in the top quartile; and *Low Industry Employment* takes the value of 1 if the industry-average change in employment is in the bottom quartile. *High City FM* takes the value of 1 if the city-level financial misconduct rate (calculated outside the firm's FF48 industry) over the past 3 years is in the top decile, and 0 otherwise. *Constrained* takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the top decile of the Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index, and 0 otherwise. Model 6 include city-level economic condition variables (i.e., 3 year averages of employment and population growth rates). The *t*-stats in parentheses are calculated by clustering errors in two dimensions: firm level and year level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable:	Change in Employment Rate					
High Industry Employment	9.11*** (14.23)	7.97*** (11.26)	8.56*** (8.35)	8.55*** (8.38)	8.60*** (8.16)	8.07*** (7.98)
Low Industry Employment	-5.29*** (-12.05)	-5.31*** (-10.61)	-6.02*** (-9.28)	-6.12*** (-9.49)	-5.93*** (-9.43)	-5.92*** (-9.12)
Constrained		-4.95*** (-9.53)	-4.94*** (-9.44)	-5.75*** (-5.00)	-5.35*** (-4.75)	-5.13*** (-4.57)
Low Industry * Constrained				2.45* (1.92)	3.02** (2.31)	2.78** (2.12)
High City FM	-0.50 (-1.31)	-0.58 (-1.49)	-0.55 (-1.57)	-0.61* (-1.79)	-0.78** (-2.27)	-0.77** (-2.27)
High City FM * High Industry Employment			-1.15 (-1.22)	-1.14 (-1.21)	-1.11 (-1.17)	-0.66 (-0.74)
High City FM * Low Industry Employment			1.33* (1.79)	1.46** (1.99)	1.54** (2.13)	1.50** (2.00)
High City FM * Constrained				1.06 (0.80)	0.91 (0.69)	0.66 (0.50)
High City FM * Low Ind. Employment * Constrained				-2.92** (-1.97)	-2.89** (-1.98)	-2.67* (-1.83)
Laq Q					0.06*** (7.34)	0.06*** (7.45)
CF					0.45*** (6.97)	0.45*** (6.94)
Constant	4.98*** (13.04)	4.81*** (11.81)	4.79*** (13.46)	4.83*** (13.60)	4.21*** (11.61)	3.68*** (8.95)
City Economic Conditions Variables						Yes
Observations	95,824	78,580	78,580	78,580	77,561	76,130
R ²	0.047	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.048	0.048

Table 6: Regional Clustering of Corporate Bankruptcy

This table contains the parameter estimates of hazard model regressions predicting corporate failures. The dependent variable is *Bankruptcy*, a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the firm experience default or delisting due to performance issues during the year, and zero otherwise. The main independent variables of interest are indicator variables capturing the level of corporate failure in the city (calculated using firms outside of the FF48 industry of the firm of interest). All firm-level control variables are calculated following Campbell, Hilsher, and Szilagyi (2008) at the end of the previous year. All models include the average bankruptcy rate in the city throughout the whole sample. Model 4 includes time-varying city-level economic condition variables (i.e., 3 year averages of employment and population growth rates). The *t*-stats in parentheses are calculated by clustering errors at the firm level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Hazard model predicting bankruptcy				
City Bankruptcy > 3% Dummy			0.1814*** (2.90)	0.1550** (2.43)
City Bankruptcy > 1.5% Dummy		0.3866*** (4.78)	0.2988*** (3.44)	0.2892*** (3.32)
City Bankruptcy > 0 Dummy	0.9361*** (6.39)	0.6398*** (3.98)	0.6425*** (3.98)	0.6895*** (4.18)
Average Bankruptcy Rate in the City	2.2313 (0.45)	-3.4549 (-0.68)	-6.7944 (-1.31)	-12.4043** (-2.25)
Log(MV)	-0.2666*** (-10.74)	-0.2660*** (-10.70)	-0.2672*** (-10.78)	-0.2645*** (-10.60)
Net Income	-0.1928*** (-6.01)	-0.1940*** (-6.13)	-0.1919*** (-6.11)	-0.1857*** (-6.02)
Leverage	0.9645*** (7.37)	0.9321*** (7.13)	0.9234*** (7.08)	0.9293*** (7.07)
Lagged Return	-1.5292*** (-8.23)	-1.5021*** (-8.14)	-1.4948*** (-8.13)	-1.4841*** (-8.09)
Cash	-0.1891 (-1.05)	-0.2029 (-1.13)	-0.2026 (-1.14)	-0.1685 (-0.95)
Price	-0.5744*** (-16.13)	-0.5743*** (-16.11)	-0.5709*** (-16.09)	-0.5747*** (-16.13)
Volatility	3.3862*** (5.37)	3.2746*** (5.20)	3.3595*** (5.34)	3.3354*** (5.19)
Log(M/B)	0.4103*** (17.11)	0.4099*** (16.94)	0.4116*** (17.02)	0.4155*** (17.13)
City Economic Conditions Variables				Yes
Observations	80,057	80,057	80,057	80,057
R^2	0.053	0.053	0.053	0.053

Table 7: Regional Financial Misconduct and Bankruptcy

This table contains the parameter estimates of hazard model regressions predicting corporate failures. The dependent variable is *Bankruptcy*, a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the firm experience default or delisting due to performance issues during the year, and zero otherwise. The main independent variables of interest is *High City FM*, which takes the value of 1 if the city-level financial misconduct rate (calculated outside the firm's FF48 industry) over the past 3 years is in the top decile, and 0 otherwise. *Constrained* takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the top decile of the Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index, and 0 otherwise. The control variables include indicator variables capturing the rate of corporate failure of more than 3% in the firm's city (model 2 onwards), in the firm's industry (model 3 onwards), in the firm's city and industry (model 4 onwards) and in the economy as whole (model 5 onwards). All models include the average bankruptcy rate in the city throughout the whole sample, and Model 6 includes city-level economic condition variables (i.e., 3 year averages of employment and population growth rates). All firm-level control variables are calculated following Campbell, Hilsher, and Szilagyi (2008) at the end of the previous year. The *t*-stats in parentheses are calculated by clustering errors at the firm level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Hazard model predicting bankruptcy						
High City FM Indicator	0.1761** (2.03)	0.1945** (2.25)	0.2163** (2.51)	0.2226*** (2.59)	0.2303*** (2.64)	0.1956** (2.22)
High City Bankruptcy		0.3514*** (6.00)	0.3008*** (5.06)	0.2566*** (4.19)	0.2389*** (3.60)	0.2393*** (3.62)
High Industry Bankruptcy			0.2969*** (5.10)	0.2688*** (4.61)	0.2604*** (4.40)	0.2349*** (3.95)
High City-Industry Bankruptcy				0.2623*** (4.16)	0.2612*** (4.13)	0.2894*** (4.59)
High Market Bankruptcy					0.0488 (0.76)	0.0303 (0.47)
Avg. City Bankruptcy Rate	5.2173 (1.07)	-4.0762 (-0.80)	-2.3305 (-0.46)	-3.7990 (-0.73)	-3.1519 (-0.59)	-9.8814* (-1.76)
Log(MV)	-0.2671*** (-10.77)	-0.2700*** (-10.92)	-0.2635*** (-10.57)	-0.2634*** (-10.57)	-0.2630*** (-10.55)	-0.2609*** (-10.42)
Net Income	-0.1919*** (-6.07)	-0.1879*** (-6.08)	-0.1783*** (-5.80)	-0.1828*** (-6.20)	-0.1817*** (-6.16)	-0.1779*** (-6.10)
Leverage	0.9754*** (7.45)	0.9425*** (7.23)	0.9472*** (7.23)	0.9525*** (7.26)	0.9494*** (7.23)	0.9558*** (7.22)
Lagged Return	-1.5477*** (-8.28)	-1.5202*** (-8.24)	-1.4869*** (-8.12)	-1.4782*** (-8.10)	-1.4760*** (-8.10)	-1.4701*** (-8.06)
Cash	-0.1812 (-1.03)	-0.1857 (-1.07)	-0.1686 (-0.99)	-0.2033 (-1.17)	-0.1989 (-1.15)	-0.1717 (-0.99)
Price	-0.5816*** (-16.31)	-0.5739*** (-16.24)	-0.5717*** (-16.28)	-0.5649*** (-16.12)	-0.5642*** (-16.12)	-0.5674*** (-16.14)
Volatility	3.2126*** (5.30)	3.3147*** (5.47)	3.4557*** (5.73)	3.5147*** (5.87)	3.5377*** (5.91)	3.4837*** (5.76)
Log(M/B)	0.4157*** (17.28)	0.4179*** (17.26)	0.4185*** (17.23)	0.4156*** (16.89)	0.4168*** (17.03)	0.4186*** (16.93)
City Econ. Cond. Variables						Yes
Observations	80,057	80,057	80,057	80,057	80,057	80,057
R^2	0.052	0.053	0.053	0.053	0.053	0.053