Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - School of Business and Economics

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Teaching

Meine Sprechstunde findet im Semester mittwochs ab 14.00 online und in meinem Büro gleichzeitig statt. Bitte fragen Sie mich per E-Mail nach einem Termin.

Working Papers

• Ulrich Kamecke (2018): Inefficient School Choice in a Long-Run Urban Equilibrium Inefficient School Choice in a Long-Run Urban Equilibrium
  
  Online Appendix
• Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke (2006): New Networks, Competition and Regulation New Networks, Competition and Regulation
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (2003): The Role of Antitrust and Regulation for the Resale of Capacity The Role of Antitrust and Regulation for the Resale of Capacity
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (2000): Competition, Cooperation and Envy in a Simple English Auction Competition, Cooperation and Envy in a Simple English Auction
  
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Publications

• Vera Angelova, Lisa Bruttel, Werner Güth, Ulrich Kamecke (2013): Can subgame perfect equilibrium threats foster cooperation? An experiment test of finite-horizon Folk TheoremsCan subgame perfect equilibrium threats foster cooperation? An experiment test of finite-horizon Folk Theorems, Economic Inquiry, Vol.51, Issue 2, pp.1345-1356
  
  DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00421.x
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• Lisa Bruttel, Werner Güth, Ulrich Kamecke (2012): Finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments without a commonly known endFinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments without a commonly known end, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 41, Issue 1, Page 23-47
  
  DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0272-z
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• Lisa Bruttel, Ulrich Kamecke (2012): Infinity in the lab. How do people play repeated games? Infinity in the lab. How do people play repeated games? , Theory and Decision, Vol. 72, Issue 2 (2012), Page 205-219,
  
  DOI: 10.1007/s11238-011-9247-6
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• Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke, Christian Wey  (2005): A Regulatory Framework for New and Emerging MarketsA Regulatory Framework for New and Emerging Markets, Communications & Strategies, Vol. 60, pp.123-136
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (2005): Die Bedeutung von Durchschnittspreisen für die Schätzung von Mehrerlösen in einem vom Durchschnitt abweichenden MarktDie Bedeutung von Durchschnittspreisen für die Schätzung von Mehrerlösen in einem vom Durchschnitt abweichenden Markt, Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis , S. 1407
  
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• Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke, Hans-Theo Normann (2004): Vertical Foreclosure versus Downstream Competition with Capital Precommitment Vertical Foreclosure versus Downstream Competition with Capital Precommitment , International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 22, pp. 185-192
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (2004): Internatlization of Knowledge Spillovers in R&D Joint venturesInternatlization of Knowledge Spillovers in R&D Joint ventures, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 160, pp.56-74
  
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• Vital Anderhub, Werner Güth, Ulrich Kamecke, Hans-Theo Normann  (2003): Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental MarketsCapacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets, Experimental Economics, Vol. 6. pp.27-52
  
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• Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke, Hans-Theo Normann  (2002): Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream CostsVertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs, Journal of Economics, Vol. 75, pp.125-135
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (2001): Dominance Solvable English Matching AuctionsDominance Solvable English Matching Auctions, Mathematical Social Sciences,
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (1998): Tying Contracts and Asymmetric InformationTying Contracts and Asymmetric Information, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 154, pp. 531-545
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (1998): Wage Formation in a Centralized Matching MarketWage Formation in a Centralized Matching Market, International Economic Review, Vol. 39, pp.33-53
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (1998): Dominance or Maximin: How to Solve an English AuctionDominance or Maximin: How to Solve an English Auction, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 27, pp. 407-426
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (1998): Vertical Restraints in the German Antitrust LawVertical Restraints in the German Antitrust Law, in Martin, S. (ed.), Competition Policy in Europe, pp.131-147
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (1997): Rotations: Matching Schemes that Efficiently Preserve the Best Reply Structure of an One Shot GameRotations: Matching Schemes that Efficiently Preserve the Best Reply Structure of an One Shot Game, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 26, pp. 409-417
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (1993): The Role of Competition for an X-Inefficiently Organized FirmThe Role of Competition for an X-Inefficiently Organized Firm, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 11, pp. 391-405
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (1993): Mean City - A Consistent Approximation of Bid Rent EquilibriaMean City - A Consistent Approximation of Bid Rent Equilibria, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 48-67
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (1992): On the Uniqueness of the Solution to a Large Linear Assignment ProblemOn the Uniqueness of the Solution to a Large Linear Assignment Problem, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 21, pp. 509-521
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (1990): Testing the Rank Size Rule with an Efficient EstimatorTesting the Rank Size Rule with an Efficient Estimator, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 222-231
  
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• Ulrich Kamecke (1989): Non-Cooperative Matching GamesNon-Cooperative Matching Games, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 18, pp. 423-431
  
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